

ZERO TRUST AUDIT CHECKLIST

# Zero Trust & Post-Quantum Readiness

Standard: NIST SP 800-207 + CISA ZTMM    Date: 2026-08-15    Confidential

Every control below requires evidence (tool output, configuration, logs) before it may be marked PASS. Scale:

PASS

PARTIAL

FAIL

N/A

UNVERIFIED — needs internal review

## A · PERIMETER GATE (EXTERNALLY VERIFIABLE)

| #   | CONTROL                                                                      | STATUS  | EVIDENCE                                |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-----------------------------------------|
| A1  | Admin console default-deny — unauthenticated access redirects to login       | PASS    | /console/ → 302 / admin-gate/ login.php |
| A2  | Origin hidden — DNS exposes only the shield, not the origin                  | PASS    | A record = shield IP                    |
| A3  | No sensitive files exposed (.git, .env, backups, wp-admin, actuator)         | PASS    | 403/404 responses                       |
| A4  | No version leak in content                                                   | PASS    | HTML scan                               |
| A5  | Security headers complete (HSTS, CSP, nosniff, frame, referrer, permissions) | FAIL    | All missing — see hardening config      |
| A6  | Stack/fingerprint headers minimized (server, via, x-powered-by)              | FAIL    | server: LiteSpeed · via: Caddy          |
| A7  | TLS floor 1.2+ (no 1.0/1.1)                                                  | PASS    | 1.2 & 1.3 only                          |
| A8  | TLS 1.3 + PQC hybrid key exchange (X25519MLKEM768)                           | PASS    | Negotiated by default                   |
| A9  | TLS 1.2 disabled (force PQC-capable connections)                             | PARTIAL | 1.2 still active                        |
| A10 |                                                                              |         |                                         |

|  |                                      |         |                    |
|--|--------------------------------------|---------|--------------------|
|  | Sensitive paths return 404 (not 403) | PARTIAL | /.git, /.env → 403 |
|--|--------------------------------------|---------|--------------------|

## B · IDENTITY & ACCESS (INTERNAL REVIEW — CONSOLE)

| #   | CONTROL                                            | STATUS     | EVIDENCE REQUIRED           |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------|
| B1  | MFA/2FA (TOTP or WebAuthn) for console             | UNVERIFIED | login config / IdP          |
| B2  | Strong password policy + rotation                  | UNVERIFIED | Policy document             |
| B3  | Rate limiting / lockout anti brute-force on login  | UNVERIFIED | fail2ban / server built-in  |
| B4  | CSRF token on login form                           | UNVERIFIED | Source code                 |
| B5  | Session cookie flags: HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite   | UNVERIFIED | Response headers post-login |
| B6  | Session expiry + rotation                          | UNVERIFIED | Config                      |
| B7  | RBAC — role-based access to console/API            | UNVERIFIED | User matrix                 |
| B8  | Account provisioning/deprovisioning (offboarding)  | UNVERIFIED | SOP                         |
| B9  | Login audit log (success/fail, IP, timestamp)      | UNVERIFIED | Server logs                 |
| B10 | Per-request authorization (not one-time auth only) | UNVERIFIED | Policy engine               |

## C · DEVICE POSTURE (INTERNAL REVIEW)

| #  | CONTROL                                          | STATUS     | EVIDENCE REQUIRED  |
|----|--------------------------------------------------|------------|--------------------|
| C1 | Device attestation / posture check before access | UNVERIFIED | ZTNA config        |
| C2 | mTLS / client certificates for service access    | UNVERIFIED | Gateway/TLS config |
| C3 | Endpoint security requirement (EDR/AV)           | UNVERIFIED | Policy             |
| C4 |                                                  |            |                    |

|  |                               |            |           |
|--|-------------------------------|------------|-----------|
|  | Lost/stolen device revocation | UNVERIFIED | SOP + CRL |
|--|-------------------------------|------------|-----------|

## D • SEGMENTATION & MICRO-SEGMENTATION

| #  | CONTROL                                                        | STATUS     | EVIDENCE REQUIRED           |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------|
| D1 | Origin not directly reachable (firewall allows only shield IP) | UNVERIFIED | iptables/nftables on origin |
| D2 | Service-to-service mTLS / network policy                       | UNVERIFIED | Service mesh / rules        |
| D3 | No lateral access between zones (DMZ/ internal/db)             | UNVERIFIED | Topology + rules            |
| D4 | API token auth per service, not blanket access                 | UNVERIFIED | Gateway config              |
| D5 | Internal DNS not exposed publicly (split-horizon)              | UNVERIFIED | DNS config                  |

## E • DATA PROTECTION (PQC & ENCRYPTION)

| #  | CONTROL                                                | STATUS     | EVIDENCE REQUIRED         |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------------------------|
| E1 | PQC hybrid TLS (X25519MLKEM768) enabled                | PASS       | openssl s_client          |
| E2 | Pure ML-KEM (future option) — hybrid recommended       | N/A        | —                         |
| E3 | Encryption at rest (disk + DB + backups)               | UNVERIFIED | LUKS/encrypted FS, DB TDE |
| E4 | Key management: rotation, vault/HSM, least privilege   | UNVERIFIED | Vault/HSM config          |
| E5 | PQC certificates (ML-DSA) — monitor ISRG/Let's Encrypt | N/A        | No public provider yet    |
| E6 | Data minimization + retention (PDPA)                   | UNVERIFIED | DPA + retention policy    |

## F • CONTINUOUS VERIFICATION & ANALYTICS

| # | CONTROL | STATUS | EVIDENCE REQUIRED |
|---|---------|--------|-------------------|
|---|---------|--------|-------------------|

|    |                                                          |            |                       |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------------------|
| F1 | Complete access logging (who, what, when, from where)    | UNVERIFIED | Gateway + app logs    |
| F2 | Monitoring/anomaly detection (login-failure spikes etc.) | UNVERIFIED | SIEM/Wazuh/Prometheus |
| F3 | Alerting + escalation path                               | UNVERIFIED | Incident SOP          |
| F4 | Log retention + integrity (append-only / hashing)        | UNVERIFIED | Log config            |
| F5 | Scheduled testing (VAPT) + remediation                   | UNVERIFIED | Test reports          |

## G · POLICY ENGINE & AUTOMATION

| #  | CONTROL                                                | STATUS     | EVIDENCE REQUIRED    |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------|
| G1 | Per-request access decisions (not network-trust based) | UNVERIFIED | ZTNA policy engine   |
| G2 | Central, versioned policy (IaC)                        | UNVERIFIED | Ansible/Terraform    |
| G3 | Automated incident response (isolate device/service)   | UNVERIFIED | Runbook + automation |
| G4 | Zero standing privileges (JIT access)                  | UNVERIFIED | PAM config           |

## REMEDIATION PRIORITIES (FINDINGS 2026-08-15)

### P1 — This week (easy, high impact)

- Add security headers at the gateway layer — HSTS, CSP, nosniff, DENY frame, referrer, permissions (A5).
- Strip **via: Caddy** and minimize the **server:** header — reduce fingerprinting (A6).

### P2 — 30 days

- Harden the login gate: MFA + rate limiting + CSRF + cookie flags (B1–B6).
- Origin isolation: firewall on the origin accepts only the shield IP (D1).
- Disable TLS 1.2 if the client base supports 1.3 (A9).

### **P3 — Quarterly**

- mTLS + device posture for internal access (C2, C1).
- PQC certificate chain when providers support it (E5) — monitor ISRG/Let's Encrypt.
- Scheduled audits + log integrity (F1–F5).

**UNVERIFIED** items require evidence from internal review (configuration, logs, SOPs). This checklist is a list of evidence to collect — not a claim of compliance.

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Template RT-ZT-CHECKLIST v1.0 · [Confidential]